Verify transmission of data over the TX and RX port.

SW test sends a known payload over the TX port. The testbench, at the same time sends a known payload over RX. On reception, both payloads are checked for integrity. SW validates the reception of TX watermark, RX watermark, and the TX empty interrupts. Choosing the max supported baud rate for the UART is sufficient.

Verify each UART instance at the chip level independently. Verify there is no aliasing on all UART ports across the instances.

Verify the RX overflow interrupt.

The testbench sends a random payload of size greater than the RX fifo size (32). The SW ignores the received the data to allow the RX overflow interrupt to assert.

Verify each UART instance at the chip level independently. Verify there is no aliasing on all UART ports across the instances.

Verify the transmission of UART while randomizing the core clock frequency.

Run the chip_uart_tx_rx test with the core clock frequency randomized between known bounds.

TODO: Find out what the range is for the core clock frequency randomization.

Verify GPIO outputs.

SW test configures the GPIOs to be in the output mode. The test walks a 1 through the pins. The testbench checks the value for correctness and verifies that there is no aliasing between the pins.

Verify GPIO inputs.

The SW test configures the GPIOs to be in input mode. The testbench walks a 1 through the pins. SW test ensures that the GPIO values read from the CSR is correct.

Verify GPIO interrupts.

The SW test configures the GPIOs to be in input mode and enables all of them to generate an interrupt. The testbench walks a 1 through the pins. SW test ensures that the interrupt corresponding to the right pin is seen.

Verify the reset values as indicated in the RAL specification.

• Write all CSRs with a random value.
• Apply reset to the DUT as well as the RAL model.
• Read each CSR and compare it against the reset value. it is mandatory to replicate this test for each reset that affects all or a subset of the CSRs.
• It is mandatory to run this test for all available interfaces the CSRs are accessible from.
• Shuffle the list of CSRs first to remove the effect of ordering.

Verify accessibility of CSRs as indicated in the RAL specification.

• Loop through each CSR to write it with a random value.
• Read the CSR back and check for correctness while adhering to its access policies.
• It is mandatory to run this test for all available interfaces the CSRs are accessible from.
• Shuffle the list of CSRs first to remove the effect of ordering.

Verify no aliasing within individual bits of a CSR.

• Walk a 1 through each CSR by flipping 1 bit at a time.
• Read the CSR back and check for correctness while adhering to its access policies.
• This verify that writing a specific bit within the CSR did not affect any of the other bits.
• It is mandatory to run this test for all available interfaces the CSRs are accessible from.
• Shuffle the list of CSRs first to remove the effect of ordering.

Verify no aliasing within the CSR address space.

• Loop through each CSR to write it with a random value
• Shuffle and read ALL CSRs back.
• All CSRs except for the one that was written in this iteration should read back the previous value.
• The CSR that was written in this iteration is checked for correctness while adhering to its access policies.
• It is mandatory to run this test for all available interfaces the CSRs are accessible from.
• Shuffle the list of CSRs first to remove the effect of ordering.

Verify random reset during CSR/memory access.

• Run csr_rw sequence to randomly access CSRs
• If memory exists, run mem_partial_access in parallel with csr_rw
• Randomly issue reset and then use hw_reset sequence to check all CSRs are reset to default value
• It is mandatory to run this test for all available interfaces the CSRs are accessible from.

Sequentially test each host to access any device

Verify the transmission of data on the chip's SPI device port in firmware mode with single mode.

• The testbench sends a known payload over the chip's SPI device input port.
• The SW test, at the same time sends a known payload out over the chip's SPI device output port.
• On reception, both payloads are checked for integrity.
• SW validates the reception of RX fifo full, RX fifo over level, TX fifo under level, RX overflow and TX underflow interrupts.
• Run with min (6MHz), typical (30-48Mhz) and max(48MHz) SPI clk frequencies. should use
• Also, ensure that the spi_device does not receive transactions when the csb is high.
• TODO, consider to test this mode with a real use case. The actual use case of this mdoe is not clear right now.

Verify the SPI device in flash mode.

• SW puts the SPI device in flash mode
• Load a firmware image (bootstrap) through flash commands to the spi_device memory.
• SW verifies the integrity of the image upon reception by reading the spi_device memory.
• Ensure the image is executed correctly

Verify the pass through mode from an end-to-end perspective.

• Configure the SPI device and host in pass through mode.
• Configure and enable both spi_host0 and spi_host1
• Send a random flash commands over the SPI device interface (chip IOs) from the testbench.
• Verify the flash commands which pass through spi_host0, are received on chip IOs.
• Verify spi_host1 doesn't send out any data from spi_device
• Run with min (6MHz), typical (30-48Mhz) and max(48MHz) SPI clk frequencies.
• Run with single, dual and quad SPI modes.
• Testbench should test the following commands:
  • Read Normal, Fast Read, Fast Dual, Fast Quad, Chip Erase, Program

Verify the command filtering mechanism in passthrough mode.

• Extend the chip_spi_device_pass_through test.
• Program the cmd_filter_* CSRs to filter out certain commands. a one byte command (such as Chip Erase) and a multi-bytes command (such as Program or Sector/Block Erase) must be added to filter
• Verify that only the payloads that are not filtered show up on the SPI host interface at chip IOs.

Verify the command filtering mechanism in passthrough mode.

• Extend the chip_spi_device_pass_through and chip_spi_device_pass_through_filter tests.
• Connect with a real flash model on spi_host
• Verify that the flash commands are received and interpreted correctly in the flash model

Verify the connectivity between spi_device and AST on scanmode and mbist

This could be done through the connectivity test with FPV

Verify the collisions on driving spi_host is handled properly

TODO, add detail testplan once we have a conclusion on #5134

Verify the transmission of data on the chip's SPI host port.

• Program the SPI host to send a known payload out of the chip on the SPI host ports.
• At the same time, the testbench transfers a known payload from device to host on the SPI host interface.
• The SPI device monitor in the testbench grabs the host payload and verifies its integrity.
• The SW verifies the device payload for integrity and services the SPI event interrupt.
• Run with min and max SPI clk frequencies and with single, dual and quad SPI modes.

Verify all SPI host instances in the chip.

Verify the transmission of data over the chip's I2C host interface.

• Program the I2C to be in host mode.
• The SW test writes a known payload over the chip's I2C host interface, which is received and verified by the testbench for correctness.
• SW validates the reception of FMT watermark and trans complete interrupts.
• Verify the virtual / true open drain capability.

Verify all instances of I2C in the chip.

Verify the transmission of data over the chip's I2C device interface.

• Program the I2C to be in device mode.
• The testbench writes a known payload over the chip's I2C device interface, which is received and verified by the SW test for correctness.
• SW validates the reception of RX watermark and trans complete interrupts.
• Verify the virtual / true open drain capability.

Verify all instances of I2C in the chip.

Verify the transmission of single-ended data over the USB at full speed. As a part of this test, the enablement of USB pullup is also expected to be verified.

Details TBD.

Verify the transmission of data over the USB at full speed. As a part of this test, the enablement of USB pullup is also expected to be verified. In this test, the USB is configured in differential mode.

Details TBD.

Verify that the USB device can detect the presence of VBUS from the USB host.

TBD.

Verify that the USB device can detect the presence of VBUS from the USB host.

TBD.

Same as the above, but tested with low power entry/exit.

TBD.

Verify the MIO muxing at input and output sides.

SW programs MIO INSEL and OUTSEL CSRs to connect and verify each muxed source. At the moment, GPIOs are the only mux inputs.

Verify the MIO output values in deep sleep state.

SW programs the MIO OUTSEL CSRs to to ensure that in deep sleep it randomly picks between tie-0, tie-1 or hi-Z for all muxed outputs coming from non-AON IPs. If an AON peripheral output is muxed, then that peripheral's output is selected to ensure in deep sleep the peripheral can continue its signaling even in deep sleep. The testbench verifies the correctness of the reflected values once the chip goes into deep sleep. This is replicated for DIO pins as well.

Verify pin wake up from deep sleep state.

Verify one of the 8 possible MIO or DIO pad inputs (randomly configured) can cause the chip to wake up from sleep state. Verifying wake on posedge is sufficient for the chip level integration testing. Upon wake up, SW reads the wake cause CSR to verify correctness.

Verify tap accesses in different LC states.

Verify pinmux can select the life_cycle, RISC-V, and DFT taps after reset. Verify that in TEST_UNLOCKED* and RMA states, pinmux can switch between the three TAPs without issuing reset.

Verify pad attribute settings for all MIO and DIO pads.

Verify pattern generation to chip output pads.

• Program the pattgen to generate a known pattern in each lane.
• Program the pinmux to route the chosen output to the chip IOs.
• Verify that the correct pattern is seen on the IOs by hooking up the pattgen monitor.
• Validate the reception of the done interrupt.
• Verify both pattgen channels independently.

Verify PWM signaling to chip output pads during deep sleep.

• Program each PWM output to pulse in a known pattern.
• Program the pinmux to route the chosen PWM output to the chip IOs.
• Program the pwrmgr to go to deep sleep state, with AON timer wakeup.
• Initiate the sleep state by issuing a WFI.
• Verify that in the sleep state, the PWM signals are active and pulsing correctly, by hooking up the PWM monitor.
• Repeat the steps for all 6 PWM signals.

Verify the alert signaling mechanism due to data integrity violation.

An automated SW test which performs the following for each IP:

• Pick a CSR to write.
• Corrupt a random control / data / integrity bit at the CPU source using SV force.
• Verify that the device detects the integrity violation causing an alert.
• Verify the alert upto the NMI stage.
• Now pick a CSR to read.
• Corrupt a random control / data / integrity bit at the device using SV force.
• Verify that the CPU detects the integrity violation causing an alert.
• Verify the alert upto the NMI stage.

Verify accessibility of CSRs as indicated in the RAL specification.

• Shuffle the list of CSRs first to remove the effect of ordering.
• Write all CSRs via JTAG interface with a random value.
• Shuffle the list of CSRs yet again.
• Read all CSRs back and check their values for correctness while adhering to the CSR's access policies.

Verify access to the debug mem from the CPU.

Verify access to the debug mem from the external JTAG interface.

Verify debug request to Ibex while it is actively executing.

Verify non-debug reset req initiated from RV_DM when the chip is awake.

Read CSRs / mem within all IPs in the chip to ensure that they are reset to the original values. Read CSRs / mem in the debug domain to ensure that the values survive the reset.

Verify non-debug reset req initiated from RV_DM when the chip is in deep sleep.

Read CSRs / mem within all IPs in the chip to ensure that they are reset to the original values. Read CSRs / mem in the debug domain to ensure that the values survive the reset. There are also other modules such as clk, pwr, rstmgr which survive this reset. Verify those as well.

TODO: rv_dm currently is not on the AON domain, so this feature does not exist ATM. Need discussion with SW/Nuvoton.

Verify ability to select all available TAPs.

Details TBD.

Verify that the debug capabilities are disabled in certain life cycle stages.

Verify that the debug mem is inaccessible from the CPU as well as external JTAG. Details TBD. X-ref'ed with the LC tests.

Verify the timeout interrupt assertion.

• Configure the RV_TIMER to generate interrupt after a set timeout.
• Issue a WFI to wait for the interrupt to trigger.
• Service the interrupt when it triggers; verify that it came from rv_timer.
• Verify that the interrupt triggered only after the timeout elapsed.

Verify the AON timer wake up interrupt in normal operating state.

• Program the PLIC to let the AON time wake up interrupt the CPU.
• Program the AON timer to generate the wake up timeout interrupt after some time.
• Issue a WFI to wait for the interrupt to trigger.
• Service the interrupt when it triggers; verify that it came from AON timer.
• Verify that the interrupt triggered only after the timeout elapsed.

Verify that AON timer can wake up the chip from a deep sleep state.

• Read the reset cause register in rstmgr to confirm that the SW is in the POR reset phase.
• Program the pwrmgr to go to deep sleep state (clocks off, power off).
• Program the AON timer to wake up the chip in a reasonable amount of time.
• Have the CPU issue WFI to signal the pwrmgr to go into sleep state.
• Verify via assertion checks, the wake up request occurs after the timeout has elapsed.
• After reset followed by AON timer wake up, read the reset cause register to confirm the AON timer wake up phase.
• After the test sequence is complete, read the wake up threshold register - it should not be reset.

Verify that the correct clocks and resets are connected to the AON timer.

• The chip_aon_timer_deep_sleep_wakeup achieves this goal.
• Verify via connectivity assertion checks, the right clocks and resets from clkmgr and rstmgr are connected to AON timer.

Verify the watchdog bark reception in normal state.

• Program the PLIC to let the wdog bark signal interrupt the CPU.
• Program the AON timer wdog to 'bark' after some time and enable the bark interrupt.
• Service the bark interrupt upon reception.

Verify that the LC escalation signal disables the AON timer wdog.

• Program the AON timer wdog to 'bark' after some time and enable the bark interrupt.
• Program the alert handler to escalate on alerts upto phase 1 (i.e. stop after wipe secrets).
• Trigger an alert to cause an escalation condition before the wakeup signal asserts.
• Wait for sufficiently long time to ensure that the bark interrupt does not trigger, to prove that the wdog was disabled.

Verify the watchdog bite causing reset in the normal state.

• Read the reset cause register in rstmgr to confirm that the SW is in the POR reset phase.
• Program the AON timer wdog to 'bark' after some time.
• Let the bark escalate to bite, which should result in a reset request.
• After reset, read the reset cause register in rstmgr to confirm that the SW is now in the wdog reset phase.

Verify the watchdog bite causing reset in sleep state.

• Repeat the steps in chip_aon_timer_wdog_bite_reset test, but with following changes:
• Program the pwrmgr to go to deep sleep state (clocks off, power off).
• Issue a WFI after programming the wdog, so that the reset request due to bite occurs during deep sleep state.
• After reset, read the reset cause register in rstmgr to confirm that the SW is now in the wdog reset phase.

Verify that the wdog can be paused in sleep state.

• Repeat the steps in chip_aon_timer_sleep_wakeup test, but with following changes:
• Program the wdog to 'bite' a little sooner than the AON timer wake up.
• Also, program the wdog to pause during sleep.
• Issue a WFI after programming the wdog, so that the reset request occurs during deep sleep state.
• After reset followed by AON timer wake up, read the reset cause register to confirm that the AON timer woke up the chip, not the wdog reset.
• Un-pause the wdog and service the bark interrupt.

Verify all interrupts from all peripherals aggregated at the PLIC.

The automated SW test enables all interrupts at the PLIC to interrupt the core. It uses the intr_test CSR in each peripheral to mock assert an interrupt, looping through all available interrupts in that peripheral. The ISR verifies that the right interrupt occurred. This is used as a catch-all interrupt test for all peripheral integration testing within which functionally asserting an interrupt is hard to achieve or not of high value.

Verify the SW interrupt to the CPU.

Enable all peripheral interrupts at PLIC. Enable all types of interrupt at the CPU core. Write to the MSIP CSR to generate a SW interrupt to the CPU. Verify that the only interrupt that is seen is the SW interrupt.

Verify the NMI interrupt to the CPU and correctness of the cause.

TBD if multiple NMI irqs are OR-ed into the CPU (example - NMI from alert handler and the watchdog bark), then map each test to this testpoint.

Verify the ability to turn off the transactional clock via SW.

Ensure that activity in any of the IPs running on this clock prevents the clock from actually being turned off until the activity is completed, at which point the clock is turned off. Verify it is off via spinwait in hints_status CSR, and then check the state of the transactional unit to correspond to a completed activity. Verify that turning off this clock does not affect the other derived clocks.

Verify the turned off transactional units.

Verify CSR accesses do not complete in units that are off. Using the watchdog timers, turn off a transactional unit's clock, issue a CSR access to that unit, verify a watchdog event results, and verify the rstmgr crash dump info records the CSR address.

A stretch goal is to check the PC corresponds to the code performing the CSR access (stretch since it could be difficult to maintain this check).

Verify the ability to turn off the peripheral clock via SW.

Verify CSR accesses do not complete in peripherals that are off. Using the watchdog timers, turn off a peripheral's clock, issue a CSR access to that peripheral, verify a watchdog event results, and verify the rstmgr crash dump info records the CSR address.

Verify clk division logic is working correctly.

This can be easily verified if we implement clock cycle counters. The IP level checks the divided clocks on each parent clock cycle.

Add formal connectivity tests to check peripherals are connected to the clock they expect.

Verify the clkmgr requests ext clk src during certain LC states.

On POR lc asserts lc_clk_byp_req on some LC states, and de-asserts it when lc_program completes. It may be best to verify this via SVA, unless we implement clock cycle counters.

Verify the chip operates correctly when clock jitter is enabled.

Run a full regression with the chip configured with jittery clocks. This can be done in the custom boot ROM for DV tests, and provide a SW knob in case some tests need to disable jitter.

Verify the cold boot sequence through the wiggling of por_rst_n.

This mainly ensures that both FSMs are properly reset on the POR signal. The check is that the processor ends up running. Also verify, the rstmgr records POR in reset_info CSR.

Verify that the chip can go into normal sleep state and be woken up by ALL wake up sources.

This verifies ALL wake up sources. This also verifies that the pwrmgr sequencing is working correctly as expected. X-ref'ed with all individual IP tests. For each wakeup source clear and enable wake_info CSR, enable the wakeup from that source with the wakeup_en CSR, bring the chip to low power, optionally disabling the source's clock, have the source issue a wakeup event and verify wake_info indicates the expected wakeup.

Verify that the chip can go into normal sleep state and be reset by ALL reset req sources.

This verifies ALL reset sources. This also verifies that the pwrmgr sequencing is working correctly as expected. X-ref'ed with all individual IP tests. For each reset source, enable the source and bring the chip to low power, issue a reset, and verify the rstmgr's reset_info indicates the expected reset.

Verify that the chip can go into deep sleep state and be woken up by ALL wake up sources.

This verifies ALL wake up sources. This also verifies that the pwrmgr sequencing is working correctly as expected. X-ref'ed with all individual IP tests. Similar to chip_pwrmgr_sleep_all_wake_ups, except control.main_pd_n is set to 0.

Verify that the chip can go into deep sleep state and be reset up by ALL reset req sources.

This verifies ALL reset sources. This also verifies that the pwrmgr sequencing is working correctly as expected. X-ref'ed with all individual IP tests. Similar to chip_pwrmgr_sleep_all_reset_reqs, except control.main_pd_n is set to 0.

Verify that the chip can be reset by ALL available reset sources.

This verifies ALL reset sources. This also verifies that the pwrmgr sequencing is working correctly as expected. X-ref'ed with all individual IP tests. Similar to chip_pwrmgr_sleep_all_reset_reqs, except the chip is not put in low power mode.

Verify the effect of main_pok de-assertion in the middle of low power entry / exit FSM transition.

The main_pok from AST is randomly forced to flip while in the middle of a FSM transition. This is done on all normal / deep sleep / reset request tests. The check that flipping during POR results in a stretched reset is done at IP level.

Verify that the pwrmgr sequences sleep_req and reset req coming in almost at the same time, one after the other.

Verified at IP level.

Verify low power entry is prevented when the chip is in "debuggable" state.

This is an open issue: https://github.com/lowRISC/opentitan/issues/7215

Verify that the chip does not go to sleep on WFI when low power hint is 0.

Verify the reset_info CSR register for lc or higher resets.

Generate the 5 types of reset at lc level or higher, and check the reset_info CSR is as expected. This and other rstmgr testpoints that require different resets cross-reference the individual IP tests that generate those resets, and this testpoint merely adds reset checks in them. Those IP blocks are pwrmgr, alert_handler, aon_timer, and sysrst_ctrl.

This should also check the reset's destination IP to make sure some reset side-effect is present. Setting some intr_enable CSR bit when the test starts and checking it after reset seems suitable. The spi_host and usbdev IPs receive multiple resets so they will need special consideration. TODO(maturana) Add specific tests once they are developed.

Verify the reset_info CSR register for sys reset.

Generate reset triggered by rv_dm, which results in a sys level reset, and check the reset_info CSR is as expected. This testpoint cross-reference the rv_dm tests that generate this reset, and this testpoint merely adds reset checks in them.

This should also check the reset's destination IP to make sure some reset side-effect is present. Setting some intr_enable CSR bit when the test starts and checking it after reset seems suitable. The spi_host and usbdev IPs receive multiple resets so they will need special consideration. TODO(maturana) Add specific tests once they are developed.

Verify the expected values from the cpu_info CSR on reset.

For some software induced resets we can predict the expected contents of cpu_info; reads of writes to unmapped addresses for example. Generate these resets and verify the cpu_info register contents when reset is handled. Refer to chip_*sys_rstrmgr_reset_info.

Verify software requested device reset.

Generate a reset request by directly writing the reset_req CSR. The reset created should be identical to those caused by hardware sources. After reset, the reset_info CSR should reflect that a software request was the reset cause.

Verify the expected values from the alert_info CSR on reset.

Various alerts can be created, for example, timeouts, and integrity errors, and at least part of the alert_info CSR can be predicted. To cause some of these to cause a reset, mask the relevant processor interrupts. Trigger these resets and verify the alert_info register contents when reset is handled. Refer to chip_*sys_rstrmgr_reset_info.

Verify sw_rst_ctrl_n CSR resets individual peripherals.

Check the peripheral is reset via timeout accessing their CSRs while the corresponding reset is active. The per peripheral reset controls in increasing order by sw_rst_ctrl_n bit, are as follows: spi_device, spi_host0, spi_host0_core, spi_host1, spi_host1_core, usb, usbif, i2c0, i2c1, i2c2.

Notice the two spi_host and usbdev IPs receive two different resets each, spi_host* and spi_host*_core, and usb and usbif respectively. This means the CSRs to be used for checking may not be obvious.

Verify all alerts coming into the alert_handler.

An automated SW test, which does the following (applies to all alerts in all IPs):

• Program the alert_test CSR in each block to trigger each alert one by one.
• Ensure that all alerts are properly connected to the alert handler and cause the escalation paths to trigger.

Verify all alert escalation paths.

Verify all escalation paths triggered by an alert.

• Verify the first escalation results in NMI interrupt serviced by the CPU.
• Verify the second results in device secrets to be wiped - read via SW to confirm.
• Verify the third results in device being put in scrap state, via the LC JTAG TAP.
• Verify the fourth results in chip reset.
• Ensure that all escalation handshakes complete without errors.

Verify all classes of alert handler interrupts to the CPU.

X-ref'ed with the automated PLIC test.

Verify the alert handler entropy input to ensure pseudo-random ping timer.

• Force alert_handler_ping_timer input signal wait_cyc_mask_i to 4'bff to shorten the simulation time.
• Verify that the alert_handler can request EDN to provide entropy.
• Ensure that the alert ping handshake to all alert sources and escalation receivers complete without errors.

Verify that the EDN clock / reset is connected to alert_handler.

• Ensure that the ping timer LFSR resets when the EDN logic is held in reset.

Verify the alert handler crashdump signal.

When the chip resets due to alert escalating to cause the chip to reset, verify the reset cause to verify the alert crashdump.

Verify the alert senders' ping timeout.

Set alert_handler's ping timeout cycle to 1 and enable alert_senders. Verify that alert_handler detects the ping timeout and reflects it on the loc_alert_cause register.

Verify that the escalation signals from the alert handler are connected to LC ctrl.

• Trigger an alert to initiate the escalations.
• Check that the escalation signals are connected to the LC ctrl:
  • First escalation has no effect on the LC ctrl
  • Second escalation should cause the lc_escalation_en output to be asserted. Read the LC_STATE CSR to confirm that it is in the escalate state.
    • Verify that the escalate_en and check_bypass_en signals are asserted. X-ref'ed with the respective IP tests that consume these signals.
  • Third escalation should cause the LC ctrl to transition to the virtual scrap state. At this stage, the CPU is not operational. Read the LC_STATE CSR via backdoor and confirm that it is is in the scrap state.
    • Verify that all decoded outputs except for escalate_en and check_bypass_en are disabled. X-ref'ed with the respective IP tests that consume these signals.

X-ref'ed with chip_lc_ctrl_broadcast test, which verifies the connectivity of the LC decoded outputs to other IPs. X-ref'ed with alert_handler's escalation test.

Verify enable to access LC ctrl via JTAG.

Using the JTAG agent, write and read LC ctrl CSRs, verify the read value for correctness.

Verify the JTAG test reset input connection to LC ctrl.

Verify the device_ID and ID_state CSRs

• Preload the hw_cfg partition in OTP ctrl with random data.
• Read the device ID and the ID state CSRs to verify their correctness.
• Reset the chip and repeat the first 2 steps to verify a different set of values.

Verify the LC ctrl initialization on power up.

Verify that the chip powers up correctly on POR.

• The pwrmgr initiates a handshake with OTP ctrl and later, with LC ctrl in subsequent FSM states. Ensure that the whole power up sequence does not hang.
• Verify with connectivity assertion checks, the handshake signals are connected.
• Ensure that no interrupts or alerts are triggered.

Verify the LC ctrl can transition from one state to another valid state.

• Initiate an LC ctrl state transition.
• Ensure that the LC program request is received by the OTP ctrl.
• Verify the updated data output from OTP ctrl to LC ctrl is correct.
• Ensure that there is no background or otp_init error.
• Verify that the LC ctrl has transitioned to the programmed state after a reboot.

X-ref'ed chip_otp_ctrl_program.

Verify the token requested from KMAC.

• For conditional transition, the LC ctrl will send out a token request to KMAC.
• Verify that the KMAC returns a hashed token, which should match one of the transition token CSRs.

X-ref'ed with chip_kmac_lc_req.

Verify the effect of putting the KMAC logic in reset.

Verify the keymgr div output to keymgr.

• Verify in different LC states, LC ctrl outputs the correct key_div_o to keymgr.
• Verify that the keymgr uses the given key_div_o value to compute the keys.

X-ref'ed with chip_keymgr_lc_key_div_o.

Verify broadcast signals from lc_ctrl.

• Preload the LC partition in the OTP ctrl with the following states: RMA, DEV, TEST_LOCKED[N] & SCRAP (tested in chip_lc_ctrl_escalation).
• Verify that the following broadcast signals are having the right effect in the respective IPs that consume them:
  • lc_dft_en_o: impacts clkmgr, pinmux, OTP ctrl & AST
  • lc_nvm_debug_en_o: impacts flash ctrl
  • lc_hw_debug_en_o: impacts pinmux, SRAM ctrl (main and ret) & the debug module
  • lc_cpu_en_o: impacts the CPU
  • lc_keymgr_en: impacts keymgr
  • lc_escalate_en_o: impacts SRAM ctrl, AES & OTP ctrl
  • lc_clk_byp_req_o: impacts clkmgr (handshake with lc_clk_byp_ack_i)
  • lc_flash_rma_req_o: impacts flash ctrl (handshake with lc_flash_ram_ack_i)
  • lc_flash_rma_seed_o: impacts flash ctrl
  • lc_check_byp_en_o: impacts OTP ctrl
  • lc_creator_seed_sw_rw_en_o: impacts flash ctrl & OTP ctrl
  • lc_owner_seed_sw_rw_en_o: impacts flash ctrl
  • lc_iso_part_sw_rd_en_o: impacts flash ctrl
  • lc_iso_part_sw_wr_en_o: impacts flash ctrl
  • lc_seed_hw_rd_en_o: impacts flash ctrl & OTP ctrl

X-ref'ed with the respective IP tests that consume these signals.

Verify the connectivity of scanmode to LC ctrl.

Verify the connectivity of scanmode reset to LC ctrl.

Verify that the SYSRST ctrl input pin values can be read.

• Drive a known value on ac_reset, ec_rst_l, flash_wp_l, pwrb, lid_open and key* pins at the chip inputs.
• Read the pin_in_value CSR to check for correctness.

Verify that the SYSRST ctrl output pin values can be set.

• Drive a known value on ac_reset, ec_rst_l, flash_wp_l, pwrb, lid_open and key* pins at the chip inputs.
• Verify that SYSRST ctrl correctly loops them back to the chip outputs.
• Write the pin_allowed_ctl register to allow some of the pins to be overridden with either 0 or 1 or both.
• Write the pin_out_ctl register to enable the override on some of the pins.
• Write the pin_out_value register to set known values on those pins.
• Verify that at the chip outputs, pins on which override should be active is reflecting the overridden values. All others should reflect the values driven on chip inputs.
• Via assertion checks (or equivalent) verify that the transitions at the inputs immediately reflect at the outputs, if not intercepted / debounced by sysrst_ctrl.

Verify the SYSRST ctrl can detect an input combination to signal an interrupt.

• Program a specific combination of transitions on pwrb, key*, ac_present and ec_reset_l pins to trigger an interrupt by writing to key_intr_ctl register.
• Program the key_intr_debounce_ctl register to debounce an appropriate time.
• Enable the interrupt at SYSRST ctrl as well as at the PLIC.
• Glitch the inputs at the chip IOs before stabilizing on the programmed transitions.
• SW services the interrupt when triggered, verifies the pin input value and key_intr_status for correctness and clears the interrupt status.
• Verify separately, eack key combination sufccessfully generates an interrupt.

Verify the SYSRST ctrl can wake up the chip from deep sleep.

• Read the reset cause register in rstmgr to confirm we are in POR reset phase.
• Program one of the com_sel_ctl_* CSRs to choose a set of inputs to be detected as a low power wakeup signal for the pwrmgr.
• Program the associated detection timer.
• Program the detection outcome CSR's (com_out_ctl) interrupt bit to 1.
• Program the pwrmgr to put the chip in deep sleep state and wake up on GSC wake up event.
• Issue a WFI to bring the chip in low power state.
• After the chip has entered low power mode, set the SYSRST ctrl inputs at the chip IOs to the programmed combination for the duration of the detection timer.
• Read the reset cause register to confirm wake up from low power exit phase.
• Read the pwrmgr wake up status register to confirm GSC wake up.
• Read the pin input value and the combo_intr_status CSRs to verify the correct combination on inputs woke up the chip from sleep.

Verify the SYSRST ctrl can reset the chip from normal state.

• Read the reset cause register in rstmgr to confirm we are in POR reset phase.
• Program one of the com_sel_ctl_* CSRs to choose a set of inputs to be detected as the GSC reset signal.
• Program the associated detection timer.
• Program the detection outcome CSR's (com_out_ctl) GSC reset bit to 1.
• After some time, set the SYSRST ctrl inputs at the chip IOs to the programmed combination for the duration of the detection timer.
• The pwrmgr will power cycle the chip once it receives the GSC reset input.
• Read the reset cause register after boot up to confirm peripheral reset phase.
• Read the pwrmgr reset status register to confirm GSC reset.
• Read the com_sel_ctl_* CSR in SYSRST ctrl we programmed earlier - it should have been reset.

Verify the SYSRST ctrl can reset the chip from deep sleep.

• Read the reset cause register in rstmgr to confirm we are in POR reset phase.
• Program one of the com_sel_ctl_* CSRs to choose a set of inputs to be detected as the GSC reset signal.
• Program the associated detection timer.
• Program the detection outcome CSR's (com_out_ctl) GSC reset bit to 1.
• Program the pwrmgr to put the chip in deep sleep state and allow it to be reset by GSC reset bit.
• Issue a WFI to bring the chip in low power state.
• After the chip has entered low power mode, set the SYSRST ctrl inputs at the chip IOs to the programmed combination for the duration of the detection timer.
• The pwrmgr will power cycle the chip from the deep sleep state once it receives the GSC reset input.
• Read the reset cause register after boot up to confirm peripheral reset phase.
• Read the pwrmgr reset status register to confirm GSC reset.
• Read the com_sel_ctl_* CSR in SYSRST ctrl we programmed earlier - it should have been reset.

Verify that the ec_rst_l stays asserted on power-on-reset until SW can control it.

• Verify that ec_rst_l stays asserted as the chip is brought out of reset.
• Verify that the pin continues to remain low until SW is alive.
• Have the SW write to pin_allowed|out_ctrl CSRs to control the ec_rst_l value and verify the value at the chip output.
• Optionally, also verify ec_rst_l pulse stretching by setting the ec_rst_ctl register with a suitable pulse width.

Verify that the flash_wp_l stays asserted on power-on-reset until SW can control it.

• Exactly the same as chip_sysrst_ctrl_ec_rst_l, but covers the flash_wp_l pin.

Verify the z3_wakeup signaling.

• Start off with ac_present = 0, lid_open = 0 and pwrb = 0 at the chip inputs.
• Program the ulp_ac|lid|pwrb_debounce_ctl registers to debounce these inputs for an appropriate time.
• Enable the ULP wakeup feature by writing to the ulp_ctl register.
• Read the ulp_wakeup register and verify that no wakeup event is detected, after some amount of delay.
• Glitch the lid_open input at the chip IOs before stabilizing on value 1.
• Read the ulp_wakeup register to verify that the wakeup event is detected this time.
• Verify that the z3_wakeup output at the chip IOs is reflecting the value of 1.

Verify that the ADC correctly detects the voltage level programmed for each channel.

• Program both ADC channels to detect mutually exclusive range of voltages. Setting only one filter CSR is sufficient.
• Program the ADC intr ctrl CSR to detect the selected filter on both channels. Enable the debug cable interrupt at ADC ctrl as well as PLIC.
• Enable the ADC ctrl to run with defaults in normal mode (depending on simulation runtime).
• Verify through assertion checks, the ADC with AST stays powered down periodically in slow scan mode.
• After some time, force the ADC output of AST to be a value within the programmed range for each channel. Glitch it out of range for some time before stabilizing to ensure that debouce logic works.
• Service the debug cable irq. Read the intr status register to verify that the selected filter caused the interrupt to fire. Read the ADC channel value register to verify the correctness of the detected value that was forced in the AST for each channel.

Verify that in deep sleep, ADC ctrl can signal the ADC within the AST to power down.

• Read the reset cause register in rstmgr to confirm we are in POR reset phase.
• Follow the same steps as chip_adc_ctrl_debug_cable_irq, but instead of programming the selected filter to interrupt, program it to wake up the chip from sleep.
• Program the pwrmgr to put the chip in deep sleep state and wake up on debug cable detection.
• Issue a WFI to bring the chip in low power state.
• After some time, force the ADC output of AST to be a value within the programmed filter range. That should cause the pwrmgr to wake up.
• Read the reset cause register to confirm wake up from low power exit phase.
• Read the pwrmgr wake up status register to confirm wake up was due to debug cable detection.
• Read the ADC channel value register to verify the correctness of the detected value that was forced in the AST.
• Repeat for both ADC channels.

Verify the AES operation.

Write a 32-byte key and a 16-byte plain text to the AES registers and trigger the AES computation to start. Wait for the AES operation to complete by polling the status register. Check the digest registers for correctness against the expected digest value.

Verify the AES entropy input used by the internal PRNGs.

• Write the initial key share, IV and data in CSRs (known combinations).
• Configure the entropy_src to generate entropy in LFSR mode.
• Write the PRNG_RESEED bit to reseed the internal state of the PRNG.
• Poll the status idle bit to ensure reseed operation is complete.
• Trigger the AES operation to run and wait for it to complete.
• Check the digest against the expected value.
• Write the KEY_IV_DATA_IN_CLEAR and DATA_OUT_CLEAR trigger bits to 1 and wait for it to complete by polling the status idle bit.
• Read back the data out CSRs - they should all read garbage values.
• Assertion check verifies that the internal states (data_in, key share and IV are also garbage, i.e. different from the originally written values.
• Assertion checks proves that all interfaces are connected across AST RNG, ES, CSRNG, EDN and AES.
• Predict the generated entropy bits and check against the observed for correctness.

Verify that the EDN clock / reset is connected to AES.

• Ensure that the PRNG within AES resets when the EDN logic is held in reset.

Verify the effect of LC escalate en signal on AES.

• Trigger an LC escalatation signal by writing to alert_test CSR (in some other IP).
• Trigger an AES operation to run.
• When the escalation kicks in, verify that the AES is in the error state.

Verify AES idle signaling to clkmgr.

• Write the AES clk hint to 1 within clkmgr to indicate AES clk is ready to be gated. Verify that the AES clk hint status within clkmgr reads 0 (AES is idle).
• Initiate an AES operation with a known key, plain text and digest. Verify that the AES clk hint status within clkmgr now reads 1 (AES is not idle), before the AES operation is complete.
• After the AES operation is complete, verify the digest for correctness. Verify that the AES clk hint status within clkmgr now reads 0 again (AES is idle), after the AES operation is complete.

Verify the AES sideload mechanism.

Details TBD, design updates pending.

Verify HMAC operation.

SW test verifies an HMAC operation with a known key, plain text and digest (pick one of the NIST vectors). SW test verifies the digest against the pre-computed value. Verify the HMAC done and FIFO empty interrupts as a part of this test.

Verify the HMAC clk idle signal to clkmgr.

• Write the HMAC clk hint to 1 within clkmgr to indicate HMAC clk is ready to be gated. Verify that the HMAC clk hint status within clkmgr reads 0 (HMAC is idle).
• Initiate an HMAC operation with a known key, plain text and digest. Verify that the HMAC clk hint status within clkmgr now reads 1 (HMAC is not idle), before the HMAC operation is complete.
• After the HMAC operation is complete, verify the digest for correctness. Verify that the HMAC clk hint status within clkmgr now reads 0 again (HMAC is idle), after the HMAC operation is complete.

Verify the SHA3 operation.

SW test verifies SHA3 operation with a known key, plain text and digest (pick one of the NIST vectors). SW validates the reception of kmac done and fifo empty interrupts.

Verify the keymgr interface to KMAC.

• Configure the keymgr to start sending known message data to the KMAC.
• Keymgr should transmit a sideloaded key to the KMAC as well.
• KMAC should finish hashing successfully (not visible to SW) and return digest to keymgr.
• This digest is compared against the known digest value for correctness.
• Verify that the keymgr has received valid output from the KMAC.

X-ref'ed with keymgr test.

Verify the LC interface to KMAC.

• Configure the LC_CTRL to start a token hash using KMAC interface.
• KMAC should finish hashing successfully (not visible to SW) and return digest to LC_CTRL.

X-ref'ed with LC_CTRL test/env.

Verify the ROM interface to KMAC.

• Backdoor initialize ROM memory immediately out of reset.
• ROM will send message to the KMAC containing its memory contents,
• KMAC will hash and return the digest to the ROM.
• ROM will compare received digest against its first 8 logical memory lines for correctness.

X-ref'ed with ROM_CTRL test/env.

Verify that the EDN clock / reset is connected to KMAC.

• Ensure that the entropy_timer resets when the EDN logic is held in reset.

Verify the KMAC idle signaling to clkmgr.

• Write the KMAC clk hint to 1 within clkmgr to indicate KMAC clk is ready to be gated. Verify that the KMAC clk hint status within clkmgr reads 0 (KMAC is idle).
• Initiate an KMAC operation with a known key, plain text and digest. Verify that the KMAC clk hint status within clkmgr now reads 1 (KMAC is not idle), before the KMAC operation is complete.
• After the KMAC operation is complete, verify the digest for correctness. Verify that the KMAC clk hint status within clkmgr now reads 0 again (KMAC is idle), after the KMAC operation is complete.

Verify the RNG req to ast.

• Program the entropy src in normal RNG mode.
• Route the entropy data received from RNG to the FIFO.
• Verify that the FIFO depth is non-zero via SW - indicating the reception of data over the AST RNG interface.
• Verify the correctness of the received data with assertion based connectivity checks.

Verify the connectivity of rng_fips_o feedback signal to RNG.

Details TBD.

Verify the transfer of entropy bits to CSRNG.

Verify the entropy valid interrupt. At the CSRNG, validate the reception of entropy req interrupt. Details TBD.

Verify the aes halt handshake with CSRNG.

Details TBD.

Verify the fuse input entropy_src.

• Initialize the OTP with this fuse bit set to 1.
• Perform an entropy request operation.
• Read the entropy_data_fifo via SW; verify that it reads valid values.
• Reset the chip, but this time, initialize the OTP with this fuse bit set to 0.
• Perform an entropy request operation.
• Read the internal state via SW; verify that it reads all zeros this time.

Verify incoming command interface from EDN.

• Have each EDN instance issue an instantiate command to CSRNG.
• When done, verify the reception of cmd req done interrupt.
• Check the data returned to EDN via connectivity assertion checks.
• TODO: explore the ability to generate predictable data and verify the received value. Details TBD.

Verify the fuse input to CSRNG.

• Initialize the OTP with this fuse bit set to 1.
• Issue an instantiate command to request entropy.
• Verify that SW can read the internal states.
• Reset the chip and repeat the steps above, but this time, with OTP fuse bit set to 0.
• Verify that the SW reads back all zeros when reading the internal states.

Verify the effect of LC HW debug enable on CSRNG.

TODO: This is pending SCA security review and might be removed.

Verify the entropy requests from all peripherals.

Verify that there are no misconnects between each peripheral requesting entropy. TODO: system level scenario: have all entropy sources request entropy in the same test one after to show boot to post boot load, cycling all entropy blocks off and on again. Ensure there are no deadlocks and everything works as expected. X'ref'ed with each IP test that requsts entropy from EDN.

Verify the keymgr advances to all states and generate identity / SW output.

• Backdoor load random value to OTP key, OTP device ID, creator and owner seeds in flash, and the ROM digest

• For HardwareRevisionSecret and LC diversification, use the constant values in design.

• Configure the keymgr and advance to CreatorRootKey.

• Generate identity / SW output for both Attestation CDI and Sealing CDI.

• KMAC should finish hashing successfully (not visible to SW) and return digest to keymgr.

• Verify that the keymgr has received valid output from the KMAC.

• Advance to OwnerIntermediateKey and OwnerRootKey to repeat the above sequences.

• Generating identity / SW output in OwnerRootKey is optional as there is not additional interaction between keymgr and other blocks.

• Advance to Disabled and verify keymgr enters the state successfully.

• Generate identity / SW output and ensure these are neither all 1s/0s nor any valid key value, which proves secrets are wiped by entropy value from EDN.

• For each operation, wait for the interrupt op_done to be triggered and check CSR op_status is DONE_SUCCESS.

• Note: there are 3 ways of calculating the expected digest for comparison. Any of them is acceptable.

  • Use SW to calculate that, and it will also exercise the Ibex
  • SW sends all the keys through CSRs to KMAC to generate the degist data
  • DV calls C functions to generate and backdoor load to a specific memory location for SW

X-ref'ed with kmac test.

Verify that the keymgr is disabled on LC escalation.

• Configure the keymgr and advance to CreatorRootKey.
• Transition life cycle to ESCALATION state, which should disable keymgr.
• Verify keymgr enters the Disabled state successfully.

X-ref'ed with life cycle test.

Verify the keymgr sideload interface to KMAC, similar to chip_kmac_app_keymgr.

• Configure the keymgr and advance to CreatorRootKey.
• Transmit a sideloaded key to the KMAC.
• Configure KMAC to use the sideload key to generate digest data.
• Verify the digest for correctness.
• Advance to 2 other operational states and repeat the above sequences (optional).

X-ref'ed with chip_kmac_app_keymgr test.

Verify the keymgr sideload interface to AES.

Same as chip_keymgr_sideload_kmac, except, sideload to AES.

Verify the keymgr sideload interface to OTBN.

Load OTBN binary image, the rest is similar to chip_keymgr_sideload_kmac, except sideloading to otbn.

Verify an OTBN operation.

• SW test directs the OTBN engine to perform an ECDSA operation.
• SW validates the reception of the otbn done interrupt once the operation is complete.
• SW verifies the correctness of the result with the expected value which is pre-computed using a reference model.

Verify OTBN can fetch RND numbers from the entropy src.

• SW initializes the entropy subsystem to generate randomness.
• SW loads an OTBN app that executes instructions to read the RND bits.
• The OTBN app ensures that the values when read consequtively do not match, and its not all 0s or all 1s, as a basic measure to ensure that the entropy subsystem is returning some data.

Verify OTBN can fetch URND numbers from the entropy src.

• Similar to chip_otbn_rnd_entropy, but verifies the URND bits.

Verify the OTBN idle signal to clkmgr.

• Write the OTBN clk hint to 1 within clkmgr to indicate OTBN clk is ready to be gated. Verify that the OTBN clk hint status within clkmgr reads 0 (OTBN is idle).
• Start an OTBN operation. Verify that the OTBN clk hint status within clkmgr now reads 1 (OTBN is not idle), before the operation is complete.
• After the OTBN operation is complete, check the output for correctness. Verify that the OTBN clk hint status within clkmgr now reads 0 again (OTBN is idle), after the operation is complete.

Verify that the EDN clock / reset is connected to OTBN.

• Use connectivity assertion check to verify that the right clock and reset signals are connected for receiving the entropy data from EDN.

Verify that the ram_cfg signal from AST is connected to OTBN.

• In open source, this is verified by a simple connectivity assertion check.

Verify the OTBN can receive keys from the OTP to scramble the OTBN imem and dmem.

• Have OTBN fetch a new key and nonce from the OTP_CTRL.
• Write and read-check OTBN and IMEM for consistency.
• Fetch a new key from the OTP_CTRL and ensure that previous contents in the IMEM and DMEM cannot be read anymore.

Verify that the CPU can access the rom contents.

• Verify that the CPU can fetch instructions from the ROM.

Verify that the rom_cfg signal from AST is connected to ROM ctrl.

• In open source, this is verified by a simple connectivity assertion check.

Verify that the ROM ctrl performs the integrity check of the ROM on power up.

• In non-PROD LC state, the computed digest does not have to match the top 8 words in the ROM. Verify that we can successfully power up the chip in this case.
• In PROD LC state, verify that the pwrmgr does not fully power up if the computed digest does not match the top 8 words of the ROM.

Verify that a glitch on the ROM ctrl's reset input is triggered as a fatal alert.

• In normal boot up from POR, the ROM contents are checked for validity using KMAC.
• After boot up, read the reset cause register in rstmgr to confirm POR reset phase.
• SW goes into idle state (nothing to do).
• The testbench randomly glitches the ROM ctrl's reset input, which causes ROM ctrl to re-check the contents for validity.
• Verify that the KMAC detects the repeat presentation of data from ROM ctrl as a fatal alert and the chip is rebooted via the alert escalation path.
• After boot up, read the reset cause register in rstmgr to confirm reset due to alert phase.

Verify scrambled memory accesses to both main and retention SRAMs.

• Trigger both SRAMs to fetch a new key and nonce from the OTP_CTRL
• Drive the CPU to perform random accesses to both RAMs and verify these operations complete successfully by using the backdoor interface
• Fetch a new key from the OTP_CTRL and ensure that the previous contents cannot be read anymore.

Verify that the data within the retention SRAM survives low power entry-exit.

Ensure that the data within the retention SRAM survives ALL low power entry-exit variations.

TODO: how to deal with the scramble keys on low power exit?

Verify that CPU can fetch data from both SRAMs when in executable mode.

• Load instruction data into the SRAMs.
• Configure main/ret SRAMs to allow instruction execution.
• Have the CPU fetch the instruction data from the SRAMs and verify that SW can finish the test successfully.

Verify the LC escalation path to the SRAMs.

• Configure the LC_CTRL to trigger an escalation request to the SRAMs.
• Verify that the SRAMs stop accepting and responding to new memory requests.
• Reset the system to exit the terminal escalation state.
• Re-initialize the SRAMs and verify that they can now respond correctly to any further memory requests.

Verify the OTP ctrl initialization on chip power up.

Verify that the chip powers up correctly on POR.

• The pwrmgr initiates a handshake with OTP ctrl and later, with LC ctrl in subsequent FSM states. Ensure that the whole power up sequence does not hang.
• Verify with connectivity assertion checks, the handshake signals are connected.
• Ensure that no interrupts or alerts are triggered.

Verify the proliferation of keys to security peripherals.

• Verify the correctness of keys provided to SRAM ctrl (main & ret), flash ctrl, keymgr, (note that keymgr does not have handshake), and OTBN.

X-ref'ed with IP tests that consume these signals.

Verify the entropy interface from OTP ctrl to EDN.

This is X-ref'ed with the chip_otp_ctrl_keys test, which needs to handshake with the EDN to receive some entropy bits before the keys for SRAM ctrl and OTBN are computed.

Verify the effect of putting the EDN domain in reset on OTP ctrl.

Verify that the computed nonce for SRAM is reset? Verify all entropy data used for various things are reset.

Verify the program request from lc_ctrl.

• Verify that upon an LC state transition request, LC ctrl signals the OTP ctrl with a program request.
• Verify that the OTP ctrl generates the LC data output correctly and is sent to the LC ctrl before it is reset.
• Verify that the lc_check_byp_en_i from LC ctrl is set.
• Ensure that the whole operation does not raise any interrupts or alerts or errors.
• After reset, verify that the LC state transition completed successfully by reading the LC state and LC count CSRs.

Verify the otp program error.

• Initiate an illegal program request from LC ctrl to OTP ctrl (example: issue program request when the lc_cnt is at max value).
• Verify that the LC ctrl triggers an alert when the OTP ctrl responds back with a program error.

Verify the correctness of otp_hw_cfg bus in all peripherals that receive it.

Preload the OTP ctrl's hw_cfg partition with random data and verify that all consumers of the hardware configuration bits are receiving the correct values.

Xref'ed with corresponding IP tests that receive these bits.

Verify the broadcast signals from LC ctrl.

• lc_escalate_en_i: read the error code CSR and verify that it reflects an FSM error state due to the escalation signal triggering.
• lc_creator_seed_sw_rw_en_i: verify that the secret2 partition is locked.
• lc_seed_hw_rd_en_i: verify that the keymgr outputs a default value when enabled.
• lc_dft_en_i: verify that the test interface within OTP ctrl is accessible.
• lc_check_byp_en_i: verify that the background check during LC ctrl state programming passes when enabled.

`X-ref'ed with chip_otp_ctrl_program.

Verify the power sequencing signals to AST, as well as the alert.

Details TBD.

Verify the connectivity of the external voltage signal to OTP ctrl.

Details TBD. TODO; This signal is not connected in the design yet.

Verify the connectivity of the scan signals to OTP ctrl.

Details TBD. TODO; This signal is not connected in the design yet.

Verify that flash initialization routine works correctly.

• Initialize the flash ctrl by writing 1 to the INIT register.

• Poll the status register for the initialization to complete.

• Verify that during the init process, the flash ctrl requested keys from OTP. Verify with different sets of key values programmed in OTP.

• Verify the flash ctrl can read seeds when lc_seed_hw_rd_en is set, otherwise all 1s.

• Verify that the flash ctrl sent the creator and owner seeds to keymgr. Verify with different seed values.

• This test needs to execute as a boot rom image.

Verify that the flash memory contents can be read by the CPU.

Nothing extra to do here - most SW based tests fetch code from flash.

Verify the SW can initiate flash operations via the controller.

Verify that the CPU can read / program and erase the flash mem. Pick an operation on all data and info partitions. Erase both, bank and page. SW validates the reception of prog empty, prog level, rd full, rd level and op done interrupts.

Verify the flash memory contents can be accessed after in RMA unlock.

• Provision an RMA_UNLOCK token in OTP.

• Reset the chip.

• Enable RMA mode, and verify that the SW can access the flash. Ensure that the previous contents are inaccessible.

• RMA entry can be on the C side as well. This should be done over C - The JTAG interface to flash ctrl is actually for the closed src.

Verify that the JTAG interface for the closed source flash macro is connected from chip IOs.

In open source, this JTAG interface is null-terminated, so we can only verify this through a connectivity test.

Verify flash scrambling via the controller.

• Extends the chip_flash_init test.

• Verify flash scrambling with different key values programmed in OTP.

• Verify read of scrambled contents via both, controller and direct host read.

• Program a new scramble key in OTP and reboot - this time we need to backdoor load the flash with new test image that is re-scrambled with the new key.

• Need to understand the bootstrapping requirements.

Verify flash_idle signaling to pwrmgr.

• Initiate flash program or erase over the controller.
• Program the pwrmgr to go into deep sleep.
• Issue a WFI.
• Ensure that the low power entry is gated until the flash operation completes.

Verify the creator and owner seeds are read on flash init provided lc_hw_seed_rd_en is set.

X-ref'ed with keymgr test.

Verify the lc_creator_seed_sw_rw_en signal from LC ctrl.

• Transition from TEST_LOCKED to DEV/PROD to ESCALATION/SCRAP state via OTP and verify that this LC signal transitions from 0 to 1 and back to 0. Verify that the SW accessibility of the corresponding partition depending on the signal value.

Verify that the creator seed is wiped by the flash ctrl on RMA entry.

Verify the lc_owner_seed_sw_rw_en signal from LC ctrl.

• Transition from TEST_LOCKED to DEV/PROD to ESCALATION/SCRAP state via OTP and verify that this LC signal transitions from 0 to 1 and back to 0. Verify that the SW accessibility of the corresponding partition depending on the signal value.

Verify the lc_iso_part_sw_rd_en signal from LC ctrl.

• Transition from DEV to PROD to ESCALATION/SCRAP state via OTP and verify that this LC signal transitions from 0 to 1 and back to 0. Verify that the SW accessibility of the corresponding partition depending on the signal value.

Verify the lc_creator_seed_sw_wr_en signal from LC ctrl.

• Transition from TEST_LOCKED to DEV/PROD to ESCALATION/SCRAP state via OTP and verify that this LC signal transitions from 0 to 1 and back to 0. Verify that the SW accessibility of the corresponding partition depending on the signal value.

Verify the lc_seed_hw_rd_en signal from LC ctrl.

• Transition from TEST_LOCKED to DEV/PROD to ESCALATION/SCRAP state via OTP and verify that this LC signal transitions from 0 to 1 and back to 0. Verify that the flash ctrl does (or does not) read the creator and owner partitions to fetch the seeds for the keymgr.

Verify the lc_escalate_en signal from LC ctrl.

• Trigger an LC escalatation signal by generating an alert.
• Verify that all flash accesses are disabled when the escalation kicks in.
• The CPU cannot read the flash either once escalation kicks in. This is unfortunately not possible because the CPU is also disabled when the escalation is triggered.
• Use connectivity check to prove that this signal is connected to the flash ctrl.

Verify that the SW can read / write the dummy memory in flash phy.

• The dummy memory is a open source placeholder for the closed source CSRs that will be implemented in a translation 'shim'.

• Verify that this region can be read / written to by the SW.

• TODO: the existing CSR / mem tests may already handle this.

Verify the connectivity of AST / top level signals.

• From AST to flash ctrl: flash_power_ready_h_i, flash_power_down_h_i, flash_bist_enable_i, scanmode_i, scan_en_i, scan_rst_ni.

• From top level (chip IOs): flash_test_mode_a_io, flash_test_voltage_h_io.

• From flash ctrl to AST: flash_alert_o.

Verify flash program and erase operations over the ctrl over a range of clock freqs.

• The range of clock freqs to test is TBD.
• Reuse chip_flash_ctrl_ops to also enable jitter on the clock as well as run with randomized clock frequencies.
• This sets the test for closed source where the flash access timing matters.

Verify that the lc_nvm_debug_en signal from LC ctrl is connected to the flash ctrl.

• Use connectivity test in the open source, since this signal is not used..

Verify that the AST generates the 4 clocks when requested by the clkmgr.

Verify the clock frequencies are reasonably accurate. Verify that when the clkmgr deasserts the enable (on account of low power entry), the clocks are turned off. Verify that when turned on (low power exit), the clocks are glitch free.

Verify the clk and rst inputs to AST (from clkmgr).

Details TBD.

Verify that the AST sys clk jitter control.

Details TBD.

Verify the USB clk calibration signaling.

Details TBD.

Verify the alerts from AST aggregating into the sensor_ctrl.

X-ref'ed with chip_sensor_ctrl_ast_alerts.

Verify the alerts from AST aggregating into the sensor_ctrl.

Details TBD.

Verify the io power ok status from AST.

Details TBD.

Run smoke tests developed for each IP.

The smoke tests are developed by the SW team to test each IP is alive, and can be actuated by the DIF. We need to ensure that they work in DV as well.

Run the coremark benchmark on the full chip.

Verify the full flash image download with bootstrap signal set.

• SW puts the SPI device in firmware mode
• Load a firmware image (bootstrap) through spi input pin to the spi_device memory.
• SW verifies the integrity of the image upon reception by reading the spi_device memory.
• Ensure the image is executed correctly

Note: This flow will be replaced by using spi_device flash mode. For detail, refer to chip_spi_device_flash_mode

Verify the secure boot flow.

Details TBD.

Walk through the life cycle stages reseting the chip each time.

Verify that the features that should indeed be disabled are indeed disabled.

Walk through device ownership stages and flows.

Details TBD.

Verify SRAM behavior during an NMI escalation.

• Trigger an NMI through the alert handler path to cause a system shutdown.
• SW should trigger a memory "initialization", fully randomizing RAM contents and initiating another key request.
• Verify that the RAMs are "wiped" once this operation completes.

The CSR test sequences will read and write accessible CSRs including the enable registers and their locked registers. The RAL model supports predicting the correct value of the locked registers based on their enable registers.

Access out of bounds address and verify correctness of response / behavior

Drive unsupported requests via TL interface and verify correctness of response / behavior. Below error cases are tested bases on the [TLUL spec]({{< relref "hw/ip/tlul/doc/_index.md#explicit-error-cases" >}})

• TL-UL protocol error cases
  • invalid opcode
  • some mask bits not set when opcode is PutFullData
  • mask does not match the transfer size, e.g. a_address = 0x00, a_size = 0, a_mask = 'b0010
  • mask and address misaligned, e.g. a_address = 0x01, a_mask = 'b0001
  • address and size aren't aligned, e.g. a_address = 0x01, a_size != 0
  • size is greater than 2
• OpenTitan defined error cases
  • access unmapped address, expect d_error = 1 when devmode_i == 1
  • write a CSR with unaligned address, e.g. a_address[1:0] != 0
  • write a CSR less than its width, e.g. when CSR is 2 bytes wide, only write 1 byte
  • write a memory with a_mask != '1 when it doesn't support partial accesses
  • read a WO (write-only) memory
  • write a RO (read-only) memory

Drive back-to-back requests without waiting for response to ensure there is one transaction outstanding within the TL device. Also, verify one outstanding when back- to-back accesses are made to the same address.

Access CSR with one or more bytes of data. For read, expect to return all word value of the CSR. For write, enabling bytes should cover all CSR valid fields.

Enable all hosts to randomly send transactions to any device

Control delays through plusargs to create tests for below types of delay

• Zero delay for sending a/d_valid and a/d_ready
• Large delay from 0 ~ 1000 cycles
• Small delay (0-10 cycles) for a_channel, large delay (0-1000 cycles) for d_channel

• Host randomly drives transactions with mapped and unmapped address
• Ensure DUT returns d_error=1 if address is unmapped and transaction isn't passed down to any device

• Drive any random value on size, mask, opcode in both channels
• Ensure everything just pass through host to device or device to host

• Randomly pick a device, make all hosts to access this device
• If the device isn't accessible for the host, let the host randomly access the other devices

Test all hosts use same ID at the same same

• Combine all sequences and run in parallel
• Add random reset between each iteration

• Inject reset while stress_all is running, after reset is completed, kill the stress seq and then start a new stress seq
• Run a few iteration to ensure reset doesn't break the design

Verify the EDN interface to KMAC.

Requires EnMasking parameter to be enabled. SW randomly configures the KMAC in any hashing mode/strength, and enable EDN mode. Randomly enable/disable the entropy_timer. // TODO - error handling is not complete, do not enable wait_timer yet. KMAC should send request to EDN once CmdStart is written, and should send out another request to EDN when either:

• entropy_timer runs down (assuming it is non-zero)
• a hash operation is completed, KMAC will refresh its internal entropy state SW verifies that KMAC produces the correct digest value.

TODO: This is pending security review discussion. It is unclear if this feature will be implemented.

X-ref'ed with EDN test/env.

Verify that the data integrity check violation generates an alert.

Randomly inject errors on the control, data, or the ECC bits during CSR accesses. Verify that triggers the correct fatal alert.

Cover the following error cases on TL-UL bus:

• TL-UL protocol error cases.
• OpenTitan defined error cases, refer to testpoint tl_d_illegal_access.

Cover all kinds of integrity errors (command, data or both) and cover number of error bits on each integrity check.

Cover the kinds of integrity errors with byte enabled write on memory.

Some memories store the integrity values. When there is a subword write, design re-calculate the integrity with full word data and update integrity in the memory. This coverage ensures that memory byte write has been issued and the related design logic has been verfied.