Device Provisioning

Contributors: Miguel Osorio, Timothy Chen, Chris Gori, Ziv Hershman,

Status: Pre-RFC

Overview

This document describes the OpenTitan provisioning flow which is divided into two stages:

  • Personalization: Covers initialization of the device with an unique cryptographic identity known as the Creator Identity, its endorsement certificate, as well as additional secrets required to configure defensive mechanisms. This occurs only at manufacturing time.
  • Owner Personalization: Covers provisioning of owner secrets and endorsement of the Owner Identity by the Silicon Owner. This may occur either at manufacturing time or as part of a later in-field ownership transfer.

Security Scope

The security scope is derived from the threats against the assets handled by the provisioning infrastructure.

Assets

The wafer foundry and OSAT are untrusted to maintain the secrecy of the following assets:

  • Device secrets
  • Provisioning appliance secrets (e.g. certificate endorsement signing keys).

Security Model

The security model of the provisioning infrastructure is based on the following requirements:

  • There is a provisioning appliance connected to an HSM in the manufacturing floor. This device is the only component trusted with secrets other than the Device Under Test (DUT).
  • There is a pre-personalization device authentication function that can be implemented by trusted components.
  • The wafer foundry does not collude with the OSAT to attack the device authentication function, although some mitigations are considered.

Device Lifecycle and Personalization Stages

Unlock Tokens

OpenTitan provides a set of lock/unlock tokens to control the state of the device in early manufacturing stages. See device lifecycle specification for more details.

  • RAW_UNLOCK
  • TEST_UNLOCK
  • TEST_EXIT
  • RMA_UNLOCK

Test unlock tokens are used as part of the process to logically disable the devices so that they can be safely transported between manufacturing stages. Unlock operations do not require CPU intervention. A test exit token is used to gate the device transition from TEST state into one of the final operational states (DEV, PROD_END, PROD).

Pre-Personalization

The following steps illustrate the set of operations required prior to personalization.

Wafer Test - Electrical Die Sorting (EDS)

  • RAW_UNLOCK: Unlock TEST mode by providing unlock token via TAP interface.

  • ANALOG TRIM & TEST (EDS): Regular analog test, scan, calibration, trimming and functional testing (EDS stage).

  • SET DEVICE_ID: Program the device identifier fuses. DEVICE_ID export may be required depending on the provisioning flow.

  • LOCK DEVICE: (Optional) Program the TEST_UNLOCK (optional) and/or TEST_EXIT tokens depending on the test flow configuration.

    Optional: If required by the manufacturing flow, lock the device for safe transport into the next test stage.

Package Test (TEST MODE) - Automated Test Equipment (ATE)

  • TEST_UNLOCK: Unlock TEST mode by providing TEST_UNLOCK token via TAP interface.

  • ANALOG TRIM & TEST (OSAT): Regular analog test, scan, calibration, trimming and functional testing (EDS stage).

  • LOG DEVICE_ID: Record DEVICE_ID and test results.

  • LOCK DEVICE: Program the TEST_UNLOCK (optional) and/or TEST_EXIT tokens depending on test configuration.

    Optional: If required by the manufacturing flow, lock the device for safe transport into the next test stage.

Package Test (DEV or PROD MODE) - Automated Test Equipment (ATE)

  • TEST_EXIT: Unlock device and transition from TEST to one of the following operational states: DEV, PROD_END, or PROD.
  • SKU SETTINGS: SKU dependent fuse and info flash configuration.
  • PERSONALIZATION: See Personalization section for more
  • LOAD FW IMAGE: Load factory image payload.

Personalization

Test Setup

The following diagram shows the physical connections between test components.

Figure: FT Connectivity

Components

  • Device Under Test: An OpenTitan device being tested as part of its manufacturing process.

  • ATE: Automatic Test Equipment (ATE), used to perform tests on the devices as part of the manufacturing process.

  • Provisioning Appliance: A network connected local server with an attached HSM. The server implements an OpenTitan compliant secure boot implementation, and runs signed applications used to communicate with ATE and cloud services.

  • Provisioning Service: Cloud service used to authenticate and initialize provisioning appliances.

    The provisioning service is used to provide initialization data to the provisioning appliance once it has been authenticated.

  • Registry Service: A cloud service used to host a device registry containing certificates and Certificate Revocations Lists (CRLs).

Connectivity

ATE - OpenTitan (DUT)

  • RST_N: OpenTitan reset pin.
  • STRAPS: Pins used to control hardware and software test functionality. On the hardware side, strap pins are used to configure TEST modes and select TAP interfaces. On the software side, straps used to enable the SPI flash bootstrap mode in ROM, as well as manufacturing test modes. Some strap functionality is only available before entering DEV or PROD states. There is also additional functionality that is disabled when the device reaches the end of manufacturing.
  • SPI: Bidirectional interface used to exchange payloads and status with the device.

Provisioning Appliance - ATE

  • Local network interface.

Provisioning/Registry Services - Provisioning Appliance

  • External network interface. Connectivity between endpoints is authenticated and encrypted. The Provisioning appliance uses service accounts to identify itself. The Provisioning and Registration Services are authenticated via TLS. The interface has to support unstable connections. The Provisioning Appliance has to be able to buffer messages to be able to recover from network disruptions.

Overview

The following diagram captures the life of a device throughout the manufacturing flow with emphasis on the personalization process.

Figure: Device personalization (high level)

Steps:

  1. Device identifiers (device_id) and unlock tokens are programmed into the device’s One Time Programmable (OTP) memory. The unlock tokens are delivered in cleartext form to each OpenTitan die.
  2. (Optional) A provisioning appliance collects all device identifiers and unlock tokens and sends them in encrypted form to a provisioning service hosted in the cloud.
  3. Wafers are transported from wafer test (EDS) to the package test (ATE) location. Devices are transported in TEST_LOCKED lifecycle state.
  4. The provisioning service authenticates the provisioning appliance(s) and sends appliance_secrets, and identifiers (device_ids) in encrypted form.
  5. Devices are tested and switched to PROD or DEV mode before personalization. The ATE test setup actuates the personalization flow in collaboration with the provisioning appliance.
    1. There are two personalization approaches supported by OpenTitan.
      1. Injection Process: The provisioning appliance generates device_secrets (in the injection case) and endorsement certificates. appliance_secrets are used to enable signing on endorsement certificates with Silicon Creator intermediate CA keys.
      2. Self-Generated Process: The device generates its own device_secrets and the provisioning appliance is used to sign the endorsement certificate.
  6. At the end of a successful provisioning flow, the provisioning appliance sends the device certificates to a device registry. Silicon Owners can use the registry as part of identity ingestion flows.
  7. The devices are shipped with a factory image and a Silicon Creator endorsement certificate. The Silicon Creator may also provide Owner Personalization services. All shipped devices have secure boot enabled, which provides a logical locking mechanism to restrict the use of open samples.
  8. The Silicon Creator may issue a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) to the device registry. The registry is in charge of serving the CRL to downstream consumers (Silicon Owners).

Secure Boot

Secure boot is always enforced by the mask ROM and cannot be disabled. Personalization and factory software payloads are signed, and boot verification is used to anchor the mechanism in which the device authenticates the provisioning appliance during personalization.

Injection Process

This section describes the personalization injection mode in detail.

P0. Get device identifier

The DEVICE is initially in LOCKED state before the start of production test. The TESTER gets the Device ID via TAP interface. The provisioning appliance returns unlock tokens associated with the Device ID.

Note 1: The Device ID read requirement applies only if unlock tokens are unique per device.

Note 2: The manufacturer must document the unlock token usage plan, including the proposed rotation plan.

P1. Unlock device and load personalization software

P1.1. The TESTER unlocks the DEVICE by sending the TEST_UNLOCK and TEST_EXIT tokens via TAP interface.

P1.2. The TESTER loads personalization software on the DEVICE using the SPI bootstrap interface. The DEVICE verifies the personalization software signature against one of the public keys stored in the ROM via secure boot.

P2. Device authentication and key exchange

P2.1 Authentication function

The authentication function relies on the following assumptions:

  • The provisioning appliance (HSM) is the only component trusted with secrets other than the Device Under Test (DUT) in the manufacturing floor.
  • The authentication function can only be implemented by trusted components.
  • The wafer manufacturer does not collude with the OSAT to attack the authentication function, although some mitigations are considered.
# Shared secret key between provisioning appliance and the DEVICE.
# The parameters of the authentication function are outside the
# classification scope of this document.
key_auth = authentication_function()

P2.2. DEVICE sends authentication data to TESTER

The DEVICE will fail to generate an authentication payload if the device is not in PROD, PROD_END or DEV state.

The DEVICE sends an authentication payload to the TESTER including:

  • Device ID (device_id).
  • Static key (receiver_pub_key) used to derive session keys1; and,
  • MAC tag covering the authentication payload.

The DEVICE sends the payload to the TESTER via SPI, repeating the message continuously to simplify timing adjustments in the test sequence.

Payload generation:

// ECC key pair generation compliant to FIPS 186-4 appendix B.4.
// Curves under consideration: NIST_P256 and NIST_P386.
receiver_priv_key, receiver_pub_key = ECC_KDF(DRBG_context)

key_auth = authentication_function()

// data_size includes the size of the data + tag.
data = "OTAU" || receiver_pub_key || device_id || data_size
tag = MAC(key_auth, data)

// Continuously broadcast via SPI device port.
return data || tag

P2.3 TESTER verifies authentication data

The TESTER calls the provisioning appliance to verify the tag attached to the DEVICE authentication payload using the authentication key function from P2.1. The TESTER aborts personalization on failure.

Verification function:

key_auth = authentication_function()

data || tag = authentication_data
calculated_tag = MAC(key_auth, data)
RETURN_ERROR_IF(calculated_tag != tag)

P3: Inject secrets

P3.1 Get wrapped personalization payload from provisioning appliance

The TESTER gets a personalization payload from the provisioning appliance. The provisioning appliance is in charge of generating the device secrets. The payload is associated with the Device ID and is wrapped with a key derived from the receiver_pub_keyextracted in step P2.

Transport wrapping. See ECIES Encryption for more details on the ECIES_ENC input and output parameters. Some parameters are omitted for simplicity.

// OPEN: ctx_id in this case is set to a portion of the device_id.
// The manufacturer shall incorporate a monotonically incrementing counter
// into ctx_id.
ephemeral_pub_key || tag || ctx_id || sender_pub_key ||
  data_size || data_enc =
  ECIES_ENC(key=sender_priv_key, receiver_pub_key,
            data=(device_secrets || creator_certificate))

personalization_payload =  "OTPL" || tag || ctx_id ||
   sender_pub_key || data_size || data_enc

P3.2 TESTER sends personalization payload to DEVICE

The personalization payload is sent to the device via SPI in 1KB frame chunks. The payload is transferred from the DEVICE SPI RX FIFO into SRAM.

P4. DEVICE unwrap and install secrets

P4.1 DEVICE unwraps secrets and creator certificate

Unwrap process. See ECIES Decryption for more details on the ECIES_DEC input and output parameters. Some parameters are omitted for simplicity.

// The following operation will verify the integrity of the encrypted
// blob. The sender_pub_key is verified against a whitelist stored
// in the personalization software.
device_secrets, creator_cerficate =
    ECIES_DEC(key=receiver_priv_key,
              ephemeral_pub_key, sender_key_pub, data=enc_payload)

P4.2 Install secrets

Secrets are installed in OTP and in Flash. See Device Secrets for a breakdown of Silicon Creator level secrets.

P4.3 Report install status

Report install status to tester via SPI interface. The status code is repeated continuously on the SPI interface to simplify the test implementation.

P5. Install factory image

The factory image is the software loaded on the device before shipping. It is not expected to change frequently once the manufacturing flow is deployed for a given SKU configuration. At a minimum, the factory image will contain a ROM Extension (ROM_EXT) component.

The TESTER programs the factory image on the DEVICE via SPI bootstrap interface The hash of the ROM_EXT must match the value used to calculate the Creator Identity as described in the Identities and Root Keys document.

P6. Provisioning result

The DEVICE boots in identity UNOWNED state and in manufacturing mode. The conditions used to trigger manufacturing mode are TBD.

P6.1 Test Creator Identity

The ROM_EXT uses the key manager to obtain the Creator Identity key. See the Asymmetric Keys section in the Attestation specification for more details.

The public portion of the Creator Identity is tested against the Creator Certificate. The result is reported to the TESTER via SPI.

Self-Generated Process

This section describes the personalization self-generate mode in detail. In this mode, The device generates its own device secrets and the provisioning appliance is used to sign the endorsement certificate.

PS0. Get device identifier

The DEVICE is initially in LOCKED state. The TESTER gets the Device ID via TAP interface. The provisioning appliance returns unlock tokens associated with the Device ID.

PS1. Unlock device and load perso firmware

PS1.1. The TESTER unlocks the DEVICE by sending the TEST_UNLOCK and TEST_EXIT tokens via TAP interface.

PS1.2. The TESTER loads personalization software on the DEVICE using the SPI bootstrap interface. The DEVICE verifies the personalization software signature against one of the public keys stored in the ROM via secure boot.

PS2. Generate and install secrets

The device uses the available on-device entropy source to generate all the device secrets.

Secrets are installed in OTP and in Flash. Fuse locks are set as described in the OTP specification.

PS3. Export public key

The device exports the Creator Identity public key via SPI. The authentication function from P2.1 is used to generate an integrity digest over the exported data.

Payload with integrity tag:

// Shared between device and provisioning appliance.
key_auth = authentication_function()

// data_size includes the size of the data + tag.
data = "OTAU" || data_size || device_id || creator_identity_pub_key
tag = MAC(key_auth, data)

// Continuously broadcast via SPI device port.
return data || tag

PS4. Generate certificate

PS4.1. Verify received data

The provisioning appliance verifies the integrity of the received payload. The verification of the payload is used to authenticate the device, since the key used to calculate the digest tag is only known to the device and the provisioning appliance.

Verification function:

key_auth = authentication_function()

data || tag = authentication_data
calculated_tag = MAC(key_auth, data)
RETURN_ERROR_IF(calculated_tag != tag)

PS4.2. Generate certificate

The provisioning appliance generates an endorsement certificate as defined in the Certificate Format section of the Attestation specification.

PS4.3. Send certificate

The certificate is sent to the device via SPI in 1KB frames. An integrity tag is added to the message using the same mechanism as in PS3.

Provisioning service to device certificate payload.

// Shared between device and provisioning appliance.
key_auth = authentication_function()

// data_size includes the size of the data + tag.
data = "OTCI" || data_size || device_id || creator_identity_cert
tag = MAC(key_auth, data)

// Continuously broadcast via SPI device port.
return data || tag

PS5. Install certificate

The device verifies the certificate payload sent by the provisioning appliance and installs it in a flash block.

PS6. Install factory image

The factory image is the software loaded on the device before shipping. It is not expected to change frequently once the manufacturing flow is deployed for a given SKU configuration. At a minimum, the factory image will contain a ROM Extension (ROM_EXT) component.

The TESTER programs the factory image on the DEVICE via SPI bootstrap interface. The hash of the ROM_EXT must match the value used to calculate the Creator Identity as described in the Identities and Root Keys document.

PS7. Provisioning result.

The ROM_EXT uses the key manager to obtain the Creator Identity key. See the Asymmetric Keys section in the Attestation specification for more details.

The public portion of the Creator Identity is tested against the Creator Certificate. The result is reported to the TESTER via SPI.

Owner Personalization

OpenTitan provides a mechanism to enable provisioning of Silicon Owner secrets and endorsement certificates in manufacturing and post-manufacturing stages. Owners are encouraged to create an implementation plan to perform post-manufacturing provisioning to take full advantage of ownership transfer.

Provisioning post-ownership transfer assumes that the OpenTitan device is integrated into a system, and there is a HOST capable of communicating synchronously or asynchronously with the DEVICE (OpenTitan) and a remote registry and provisioning service.

The physical transport layer between the DEVICE and the HOST is use-case specific and managed at the OpenTitan SKU configuration level (e.g. different ROM_EXT implementation per SKU).

Overview

The following diagram captures the Silicon Owner provisioning flow. Device attestation requires the device to have a valid Creator Identity endorsed by the Silicon Creator as described in the Personalization section.

The process can be implemented during manufacturing or post-manufacturing. If implemented during manufacturing, the ATE and provisioning appliance fulfill the role of the HOST.

Figure: Owner personalization

Steps:

  1. Device identifiers (device_id) and Silicon Creator Certificates are imported into the Silicon Owners internal device registry.
  2. Ownership transfer is performed on the device to provision code verification keys used as part of secure boot. Software signed by the Silicon Owner is programmed on the device.
  3. The host verifies the attestation chain provided by the device and requests a provisioning payload from the Silicon Owner’s provisioning service. Data in transit is encrypted with a key negotiated between the OpenTitan device and the provisioning service. Provisioning data is divided into:
    1. Owner Certificate endorsed by the Silicon Owner. The owner can also implement endorsement of additional certificates as part of the process.
    2. Additional Owner secrets required to provision application level secrets.
  4. The host sends the provisioning payload to the device. The device unwraps the secrets and installs them.

Injection Process

Figure: Provisioning post-ownership transfer

RP0. Ownership transfer

The DEVICE is initially in UNOWNED state. The Silicon Owner triggers ownership transfer and loads new software. Ownership transfer details are covered in a separate document.

See Ownership Transfer document for more details.

RP1. Get attestation certificates

The HOST requests attestation certificates from the DEVICE. A device that has been transferred to a new owner has its attestation chain rooted in the Creator Identity. See the Attestation documentation for more information.

RP2. Get receiver_pub_key

The DEVICE generates a receiver key pair and shares the receiver_pub_key with the HOST.

Additional data required to generate a new owner certificate and/or device secrets is added to the payload. The payload is signed with the owner_identity_key which can be verified against the DEVICE attestation chain obtained in RP1.

// ECC key pair generation compliant to FIPS 186-4 appendix B.4.
// Curves under consideration: NIST_P256 and NIST_P386.
receiver_priv_key, receiver_pub_key = ECC_KDF(DRBG_context)

data = any additional data required to generate the owner cert.
hdr = ctx_id || receiver_pub_key || data

// owner_identity_key is an ECC key as described in the Asymmetric
// Keys section of the Attestation document.
signature = ASYM_SIGN(key=owner_identity_priv_key, data=hdr)

payload = hdr || signature

RP3. Get wrapped secrets and owner certificate

RP3.1. The provisioning service verifies the receiver_pub_key against the attestation chain obtained in RP1 and the internal device registry.

The provisioning service then generates a new owner_certificate with the additional data provided by the DEVICE. The certificate is signed with a key managed by the Silicon Owner (e.g. owner_intermediate_ca_key). The new owner_certificate will be used as the root certificate in Attestation flows as described in the Attestation document.

RP3.2. The provisioning service performs ECIES encryption using the following parameters:

  • sender_priv_key: Provisioning service private key. The public portion is known to the DEVICE firmware.
  • receiver_pub_key: DEVICE public key obtained in step RP2.
  • ctx_id: Context ID provided by the device in step RP2.
  • owner_certificate: New owner certificate generated in step RP3.1.
  • device_secrets: Additional secrets bound to the device. May be generated offline or as part of step RP3.1.
payload =
ECIES_ENC(key=sender_priv_key, pub_key=receiver_pub_key,
            data=(device_secrets | ctx_id))
| owner_certificate

RP3.3. The wrapped payload is sent to the DEVICE.

RP4. Unwrap and install secrets and owner certificate

Device performs ECIES decryption to unwrap the payload and install the new owner_certificate and device_secrets. The owner has access to info flash pages for storage of secrets.

The server_key_pub and ephemeral_pub_key values are sent with the wrapped payload. The public server key (server_key_pub) is also known to the software running in the DEVICE.

device_secrets || owner_certificate =
    ECIES_DEC(key=receiver_priv_key, server_key_pub,
              ephemeral_pub_key, data=enc_payload)

RP5: Get attestation certificates

The HOST issues a new attestation command to the DEVICE. The DEVICE responds with an attestation chain rooted on the new owner_certificate. An additional test command can be supported to test any functionality associated with the device_secrets.

ECIES Operations

Key Establishment

Key exchange is based on NIST 800-56Ar3 6.2.1.2 Cofactor One-Pass Unified Model Scheme, employing one ephemeral key, two secret keys and ECC CDH. Both sender and receiver authentication are performed via public crypto, thus one secret key is associated with the receiver, while the other one is associated with the sender.

AEAD Modes of Operation

The following authenticated encryption schemes are supported by this architecture:

  • AES-CTR-HMAC-12B-IV-32B-Tag (FIPS OK)
  • AES-CTR-HMAC-16B-IV-32B-Tag (FIPS OK)
  • AES-GCM (FIPS OK)

Encryption

Figure: ECIES Encryption, simplified diagram

Inputs:

  • receiver_pub_key: ECC public key provided by the receiver point (e.g. NIST_P256, NIST_P386
  • sender_priv_key: Sender ECC private key.
  • ctx_id: Context identifier provided by the device. Used to control forward secrecy of the protocol. For personalization this value is set to a portion of the device identifier (device_id).
  • data, data_size: Data to be encrypted and its size
  • ecies_key_length: Target ECIES key length. Used as a configuration parameter.

Outputs:

  • ephemeral_pub_key: Ephemeral ECC shared key, required to perform decryption.
  • tag: MAC over payload.
  • ctx_id: Context identifier provided by the device.
  • sender_pub_key: Sender ECC public key.
  • data_enc, data_size: Encrypted data and its size.

Algorithm:

// NIST 800-56Ar3 6.2.1.2 One-Pass Unified Model. This requires
// the creation of two shared secrets: shared_ephemeral and
// shared_static.
ephemeral_priv_key = GenerateEphemeralKey()
shared_ephemeral =
    ECDH_compute_key(key_len,
                     EC_POINT(receiver_pub_key), ephemeral_priv_key)
shared_static =
    ECDH_compute_key(key_len,
                     EC_POINT(receiver_pub_key), sender_priv_key)

// Key derivation function used to calculate K and IV.
K, IV = key_and_iv_generaration(
   ctx_id, data_size, shared_ephemeral, shared_static,
   receiver_pub_key, sender_pub_key)

// The following authenticated encryption approach follows encrypt
// then MAC approach.
// See also Alternative Authenticated Encryption Scheme

// Ke length should be one of 128, 192, 256.
// Km length should be one of 256, 384, 512.
// K should have an entropy with a security strength equivalent to
// the one provided by Ke and Km when used with AES_CTR and MAC
// respectively.
[Ke || Km] = K

data_enc = AES_CTR_ENC(Ke, IV, data)
tag = MAC(Km, ctx_id || sender_pub_key || data_size || data_enc)

return [
  ephemeral_pub_key || tag || ctx_id || sender_pub_key ||
  data_size || data_enc]

Alternative Authenticated Encryption Scheme

The following implementation uses AES in GCM mode to obtain the ciphertext and integrity tag.

// The following authenticated encryption approach removes the need
// for separately calling a MAC function. In this case there is no
// need to split the key K into Ke and Km components.

// All the parameters are taken from the main encryption pseudo-code
// block above. The following call replaces the AES_CTR and MAC
// calls.
data_enc, tag =
   AES_GCM_ENC(K, IV, ctx_id || sender_pub_key || data_size || data)

Decryption

Figure: ECIES Decryption, simplified diagram

Inputs:

  • receiver_priv_key: Receiver ECC private key. Generated by the device and associated with the context identifier (ctx_id).
  • ephemeral_pub_key: Ephemeral ECC shared key generated by the sender.
  • sender_pub_key: Sender ECC public key. Embedded in payload sent to the device.
  • ctx_id: Context identifier provided by the device.
  • data, data_size: Encrypted data and its size.
  • ecies_key_length: Target ECIES key length. Used as a configuration parameter.

Outputs:

The algorithm implementation currently includes authentication and integrity checks, thus plaintext is the only documented output parameter.

  • plaintext, size: Plaintext data and its size.

Algorithm:

[ephemeral_pub_key || tag || ctx_id ||
 sender_pub_key || data_size || ciphertext ] = data

// Check sender_pub_key against whitelist stored in device software.
check_sender_key(sender_pub_key)

// NIST 800-56Ar3 6.2.1.2 One-Pass Unified Model. This requires
// the creation of two shared secrets: shared_ephemeral and
// shared_static.
ephemeral_key = GenerateEphemeralKey()
shared_ephemeral =
    ECDH_compute_key(key_len,
                     EC_POINT(ephemeral_pub_key), ephemeral_priv_key)
shared_static =
    ECDH_compute_key(key_len,
                     EC_POINT(sender_pub_key), ephemeral_priv_key)

// Key derivation function used to calculate K and IV.
K, IV = key_and_iv_generaration(
   ctx_id, data_size, shared_ephemeral, shared_static,
   receiver_pub_key, sender_pub_key)

// The following authenticated encryption approach follows encrypt
// then MAC approach.
// See also

// Ke length should be one of 128, 192, 256.
// Km length should be one of 256, 384, 512.
// K should have an entropy with a security strength equivalent to
// the one provided by Ke and Km when used with AES_CTR and MAC
// respectively.
Ke || Km = K

tag_expected =
   MAC(Ke, ctx_id || sender_pub_key || data_size || data_enc)

RETURN_ERROR_IF(tag != tag_expected)
RETURN_ERROR_IF(ctx_id != ctx_id_expected)

plaintext = AES_CTR_DEC(Km, IV, data=ciphertext)

return [plaintext]

Key and IV Derivation

Inputs:

  • shared_ephemeral: Derived ephemeral key. See Encryption and Decryption algorithms for more details.
  • shared_static: Derived static key.
  • ctx_id: Context identifier provided by the device.
  • data_size: Size of input data.
  • ecies_key_length: Target ECIES key length. Used as a configuration parameter.

Outputs:

  • K: ECIES key of size equal to ecies_key_length.
  • IV: IV parameter derived to use as AES decrypt parameter.

Algorithm:

shared_secret = shared_ephemeral || shared_static
salt = "shared_tag" || ctx_id || 00's padding

// KDF based on NIST 800-56C 2-step key derivation. The extract and
// expand operations can be implemented via HMAC-SHA2. For SHA3 see
// Alternative KDF 1-step KMAC.
KDK = HKDF_extract(salt=salt, secret=shared_secret)

L = ecies_key_length
label = "ot_encrypt"
context = receiver_pub_key || sender_pub_key
fixed_info = label || context || STRING(L)

K = HKDF_expand(KDK, L, fixed_info)

# IV generation using additional HKDF_expand
fixed_info_iv = "ot_iv" || context || STRING(12)
IV = HKDF_expand(KDK, 12, fixed_info_iv)

return K, IV
Alternative KDF 1-step KMAC

The following implementation uses a one-step key derivation function based on a KMAC implementation (e.g. KMAC256).

// KDF based on NIST 800-56C section 4.1 1-step key derivation.
// Using KMAC256 as specified in section 4.1 option 3.
L = ecies_key_length
label = "ot_encrypt"
context = receiver_pub_key || sender_pub_key
fixed_info = label || context || STRING(L)

salt =
   "shared_tag" || ctx_id || 00's padding up to key size

other_input = salt || fixed_info
K = HKDF(secret=shared_secret, L, other_intput)


fixed_info_iv = "ot_iv" || context || STRING(12)
IV = HKDF(secret=shared_secret, 12,
          other_input=salt || fixed_info_iv)

return K, IV

Notes


  1. This is a static key within the context of a personalization run. The key is erased after personalization is complete. ↩︎